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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The appellants filed their petition for interlocutory 
appeal pursuant to Rule 5, R. Utah S. Ct. This Court granted the 
petition by order dated March 19, 1986 [sic]- (R. 218). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Does the U.C.C. statute of repose, Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-2-725, (1980), apply to warranty actions in which the aggrieved 
party seeks reimbursement for damage to property caused by a 
defective product? 
(2) If the U.C.C. statute of repose applies to warranty 
claims for property damage, does the statute violate Article I, 
Section 11, of the Utah Constitution? 
(3) Are Davidson Lumber Sales1 non-warranty claims 
barred? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an indemnity/contribution action brought by 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. (hereinafter "Davidson") against 
Bonneville Investment, Inc. and the Estate of Leonard M. Sproul 
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sproul") under theories of 
breach of warranty and negligence. Sproul brought a motion for 
summary judgment in the trial court, alleging that Davidson!s claims 
were barred under the terms of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) . 
Sproul has appealed the lower court!s interlocutory order denying 
this motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Davidson purchased a glue-laminated, wood beam from 
Bonneville Investment, Inc. on April 29, 1976. (R.184,196) 
Davidson, in turn, sold this beam to Quality Construction. (R. 
185,196). Ultimately, Abrams Construction Co. incorporated the beam 
in the construction of a Thrifty Drug Store in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
(R. 185,196). On October 20, 1978, the roof of the Thrifty Drug 
Store collapsed, causing property damage in excess of $80,000. (R. 
017,196). 
On July 26, 1983, Davidson filed the present action 
against Sproul claiming indemnity and contribution under theories of 
breach of warranty and negligence. (R. 002-006). Davidson settled 
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Thrifty Corporation's claims against it on November 16, 1983 for 
$45,000. (R. 087-089). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 
1984) was a breach of contract action distinguishable from the case 
here which sounds in tort. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial 
Code primarily designed the code to protect the economic expecta-
tions of contracting parties. The U.C.C. statute of repose, Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980), reflects the commercial code's contract 
orientation and is suitably applied only in situations where the 
gist of the claim is frustration of economic expectations. To apply 
the U.C.C. statute of repose to bar Davidson's claim would be 
unconstitutional under the analysis used by this Court in Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
If this Court ultimately determines that Davidson's breach 
of warranty claim against Sproul is barred, Utah Code Ann. §7 0A-2-
725 (1980) does not affect the negligence claim which Davidson has 
asserted against Sproul, because the two theories are independent of 
one another and can be pleaded in the alternative. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-725 (1980) WAS 
DESIGNED ONLY TO BAR COMMERCIAL CONTRACT CLAIMS 
AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES SUCH AS THIS 
WHERE THE GRAVAMEN OF THE COMPLAINT SOUNDS IN 
TORT. 
A. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. Is Distinguishable from 
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This Case. 
Sproul relies upon Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 
681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984) for its argument that Davidsonfs claims are 
barred. While Perry has a superficial resemblance to this case, 
there is a critical difference. 
Perry, a sub-contractor, purchased doors from Pioneer 
Wholesale for installation in a medical center. Four months after 
Perry installed the doors, Perry's contractor notified Perry that 
the doors were defective. The contractor later brought an action 
against Perry for breach of contract. Nearly five years after he 
was put on notice that the doors were defective, Perry brought a 
claim against Pioneer Wholesale. Although couched in terms of 
indemnity, Perry essentially claimed that he had not obtained the 
benefit of his bargain. This court held that Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-
725 (1980) barred the claim. 
The distinguishing feature between Perry and this case is 
the nature of the damages sought. Utah Code Ann. §7 0A-2-72 5 (1980) 
applied in Perry because the statute is a contract limitation and 
Perry was seeking contract damages. However, the limitation should 
not apply here, because Davidson's claims sound in tort. The 
confusion concerning the application of U.C.C. §2-725 to this type 
of claim results from anomalies in the Uniform Commercial Code due 
to the development of products liability law. 
B. The U.C.C. Reflects Early Product Liability Development. 
Because early 2 0th century courts recognized the diffi-
culties encountered by injured persons attempting to prove negli-
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gence in the manufacture and design of products, the courts turned 
to warranty theories to alleviate the plaintiffs1 burden. (See, 
Murray, Products Liability v. Warranty Claims: Untangling the Web, 3 
Journal of Law & Commerce pp. 272-73 (1983) hereinafter referred to 
as Untangling the Web). Professor Karl Llewellyn, the father of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, recognized this emerging trend and tried to 
include in the embryonic commercial code a provision similar to what 
is now Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (strict products liabi-
lity) . However his fellow committee members rejected the proposal, 
because they considered it more suited to tort law. (See Wade, Tort 
Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the 
U.C.C. 48 Mo. L. Rev. pp 13-20. (1983) hereinafter "Tort Liabi-
lity"). One commentator sympathetically noted Professor Llewellynfs 
predicament as follows: 
In 1941, Professor Llewellyn tried to convince 
the skeptics of the necessity for a direct 
concept of risk allocation which would strip 
away the fictions but he failed. He still had 
to put together the new sales law, and he was 
still faced with the case law development of 
products liability under the warranty fiction. 
Since he could not attack the problem directly, 
he felt compelled to tack it on, to say some-
thing about it as an appendage to a commercial 
code. Therefore, he did the best patchwork he 
could do. 
Untangling the Web,, at 275. This patchwork included section 2-715 
(codified as Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-715 (1980))—a provision for 
consequential damages upon a sellerfs breach. Unfortunately, the 
warranty fiction had some unintended results, given the enterprising 
nature of defense counsel: 
The warranty fiction was judicially developed, 
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first in the food and beverage cases and then in 
the cosmetic cases. Eventually, the floodgates 
opened and any product which caused injury could 
be the subject of a strict liability claim under 
the rubric of warranty. If the courts were 
willing to permit the use of this fiction to 
allocate risks to entrepreneurs, the lawyers for 
the defense would have their day. With unas-
sailable logic, they began to urge the defenses 
of the fiction. 
Untangling the Web, at 273. Such is the case here, where Sproul is 
urging the application of a contract limitation to bar what in 
essence is a tort action. 
One author has specifically noted that U.C.C. §2-725 was 
never designed nor intended to apply to the situation we have here: 
Section 2-725 sets the period for limitation of 
action at four years from the time the breach of 
warranty occurs. The breach occurs "when tender 
of delivery is made." This is obviously based 
entirely on the concept that the product is not 
in accordance with expectations so the buyer has 
been damaged and has a cause of action at the 
moment the article is tendered to him. It 
completely fails to provide appropriate relief 
in the case of personal injury, where the cause 
of action arises only when the injury occurs. 
If the injured party is not the buyer, the 
statute of limitations may well have run before 
he even has a cause of action. The drafters 
were clearly not thinking of personal injury 
cases in this section, and if it applies to them 
the unjust result carries overtones of uncon-
stitutionality. The courts have uniformly felt 
that they must be resourceful to find a way 
around such an "unbelievable" result. The usual 
method is to find that the provision is not 
intended to apply to tort actions. 
Tort Liability, at 9-10. 
C. The Courts Have Properly Limited U.C.C. § 2-725 to Its Com-
mercial Context. 
Courts have refused to mechanistically apply U.C.C. §2-725 
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to bar actions sounding in tort. For example, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in Heavner v. Uniroval, Inc., 305 A.2d 412 (N.J. 
1973), held that the New Jersey analog to Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 
(1980) did not apply to the claim of a person who had suffered 
personal injury and property damage as a result of a defective tire 
even though the claim was phrased in terms of warranty: 
When the gravamen is a defect in the article and 
consequential personal injury and property 
damages are sought, they will be taken for what 
they actually are, no matter how expressed. 
Heavner, 305 A.2d at 427. The California Appellate Court in Becker 
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Cal. App. 1975) 
in following Heavner discussed the decision as follows: 
The court held, therefore, that the statute of 
limitations for tort actions and not the Code 
statute of limitations governed the plaintiffs' 
action for breach of warranty both against the 
retailer and the manufacturer. In so holding, 
the court observed that the matter before them 
was a consumer's action in strict liability in 
tort. The court pointed out that their cases 
follow the view of the Restatement and Dean 
Prosser, namely, that such causes of action 
represent a new concept not governed by the 
commercial contract thesis of the Code provi-
sions and that one gains no advantage by 
pleading them in terms of breach of warranty, 
express or implied. Finally, the Heavner court 
announced its rule that, when the gravamen is a 
defect in the article and consequential personal 
injury and property damages are sought, they 
will be taken for what they actually are, no 
matter how expressed. 
Becker, 125 Cai. Rptr. at 330. 
In a concurring opinion in Victorson v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co. , 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y.#1975)—a decision in which the 
Court of Appeals of New York overruled a prior decision which had 
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held that §2-725 superseded all other statutes of limitation in 
products cases—Judge Fuchsberg expressed his views as follows: 
Indeed, a careful reading of section 2-725 of 
the code (or the comments to it) , where the 
four-y ear-from-time-of-delivery limitation is 
set out, points up the complete absence of 
references to personal injury and third-party 
beneficiary actions. The inference is that the 
intent was to deal exclusively with commercial 
transactions. 
Victorson, 335 N.E.2d at 281. 
Each of the cited courts recognized that U.C.C. §2-725 was 
designed to apply only where the plaintiff seeks damages for 
frustration of its economic expectations—a true commercial applica-
tion. By adopting a similar approach, this court need not consider 
constitutional problems otherwise engendered by broader application 
of the statute. 
POINT II: TO APPLY UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-725 
(1980) TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WOULD VIOLATE 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985), the heirs of an individual killed in an airplane accident 
brought an action against the airplane's manufacturer. Because the 
airplane had been manufactured approximately 2 0 years prior to the 
date of the accident, the Utah Product Liability Act statute of 
repose, Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3 (1953), barred the plaintiffs' 
claims before they arose. This court held the statute unconsti-
tutional as being a violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution—the "open courts" provision. The analysis employed in 
Berry is directly applicable to the circumstances here. 
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In Berry, this court defined a statute of repose as 
follows: 
A statute of repose bars all actions after a 
specified period of time has run from the 
occurrence of some event other than the occur-
rence of an injury that gives rise to a cause of 
action. 
Berrv. 717 P. 2d at 672. Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) is a 
statute of repose under the Berry criterion, because the statute 
provides for a four-year period which commences not at the time that 
the product causes injury but at the time the product is tendered 
for delivery. 
In Berry, this court held that in order to satisfy Article 
I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the law must either (1) 
allow an alternative remedy for the right abrogated which is 
substantially equal in value or comparable in substantive protec-
tion, or (2) if no substitute or alternative remedy is provided, the 
abrogation of the remedy is valid only if there is a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and elimination of the existing legal 
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. Berry. 717 P.2d at 680. 
The statute at issue abrogates all actions for breach of 
warranty after four years from the tender of the product. The 
statute makes no allowance for injuries occurring more than four 
years after delivery or situations as here, where Davidson's right 
to reimbursement did not arise until after Davidson had paid for the 
property damage caused by the beam's defects. The statute can 
stand only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
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eliminated and the elimination of the legal remedy is not an 
arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective. Utah 
Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) does not meet those requirements. 
The rationale for this statute is found in the official 
comments promulgated by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
To introduce a uniform statute of limitations 
for sales contracts, thus eliminating the 
jurisdictional variations and providing needed 
relief for concerns doing business on a nation-
wide scale whose contracts have heretofore been 
governed by several different periods of 
limitation depending upon the state in which the 
transaction occurred. This Article takes sales 
contracts out of the general laws limiting the 
time for commencing contractual actions and 
selects a four year period as the most ap-
propriate to modern business practice. This is 
within the normal commercial record keeping 
period. 
U.C.C. §2-725 official comment (1977). Hence, the purpose for 
U.C.C. §2-725 was to establish a uniform limitation period for 
interstate businesses which ostensibly accords with the period 
during which business records are normally kept. Davidson asserts 
that the statute is arbitrary and an unreasonable means of achieving 
its goals. 
Three factors considered in Berry directly apply to the 
statute at issue here. First, this court in Berry considered the 
Utah Product Liability Act's statute of repose to be arbitrary 
because the limitation applied to all products regardless of their 
life expectancy. Berry, 717 P. 2d at 681. Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-
725 (1980) is similarly arbitrary. It does not differentiate 
between products intended to be consumed in a very short period of 
time and longer lived products such as the product at issue here—a 
beam which was intended by all parties to be an integral part of a 
structure expected to last for a great number of years. 
Second, this court in Berry considered the Utah Product 
Liability Act to be incapable of achieving its avowed purpose. 
Berry, 717 P.2d at 681-682. Here, the primary purpose for the four-
year statute is to impose a nationally uniform limitation statute in 
the interest of interstate commerce. Utah citizens benefit from 
uniformity only if other states have passed identical statutes. 
However, there is already a lack of uniformity among the states—one 
commentator noting that eight states have modified, repealed, or 
never adopted U.C.C. §2-725. (See Williams, The Statute of Limita-
tions, Prospective Warranties, and Problems of Interpretation in 
Article Two of the U.C.C, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 67, n.2 (1983)). 
Whether this court upholds Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) on this 
appeal or not, uniformity will not be achieved. 
Third, this court in Berry noted that the Utah Product 
Liability Act statute of repose was likely to provide less incentive 
to manufacturers to take adequate safety measures. Berry, Ill P.2d 
at 683. The same consideration applies with even more force here. 
If a manufacturer's warranty is limited to only four years after 
tender of delivery—two years less than the Utah Product Liability 
Act statute of repose provided—the manufacturer has even less 
incentive than it would otherwise have to ensure the safety of its 
products. 
Because Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) arbitrarily 
limits the period of warranty regardless of the life expectancy of 
11 
the product, fails in its essential purpose to provide a uniform 
nationwide limitation period, and limits the incentive that a 
manufacturer may have to produce safe products, this Court should 
declare the statute unconstitutional as a violation of Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT III: DAVIDSONfS NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST 
SPROUL IS INDEPENDENT OF AND NOT GOVERNED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-2-725 (1980). 
A. Davidson's Claim Can Be Sustained Under Alternative Theories. 
In footnote 2 of its brief, Sproul claims that no matter 
how Davidson terms its cause of action, the claim is one of breach 
of warranty only. This contention, however, cannot withstand 
scrutiny. 
Sproul has not stated the specific reasoning under which 
it makes its assertion. Sproul certainly cannot base its proposi-
tion on an election of remedies theory. Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, permits a plaintiff to state alternative causes of 
action, and this Court in Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 
146 (1962), specifically held that it is error for a court to force 
such an election. Apparently, Sproul believes that no negligence 
action can lie in the circumstances present here. A case cited by 
this court in Perry amply demonstrates why this contention is 
incorrect. 
In Perry, Justice Oaks noted that this court has never 
accepted the blending of tort and contract concepts, citing Moorman 
Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (111. 1982). 
12 
Perry, 681 P. 2d at 217-18, n.3. Moorman illustrates the situation 
when a products claim must be limited to breach of warranty only. 
Moorman had purchased a tank from National. After the 
tank ruptured, Moorman claimed damages under negligence, strict 
products liability, and breach of warranty theories for repair of 
the tank and loss of its use. The Illinois Supreme Court specifi-
cally noted that Moorman was seeking damages for economic loss which 
the court defined as: 
ff[D]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair 
and replacement of the defective product, or 
consequent loss of profits—without any claim of 
personal injury or damage to other property * * 
*
,f
 as well as "the diminution in the value of 
the product because it is inferior in quality 
and does not work for the general purposes for 
which it was manufactured and sold." These 
definitions are consistent with the policy of 
warranty law to protect expectations of suit-
ability and quality. (Citations omitted.) 
Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 449. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's dismissal of the tort claims, stating: 
Our conclusion that qualitative defects are best 
handled by contract, rather than tort, law 
applies whether the tort theory involved is 
strict liability or negligence. Tort theory is 
appropriately suited for personal injury or 
property damage resulting from a sudden or 
dangerous occurrence of the nature described 
above. The remedy for economic loss, loss 
relating to a purchaser!s disappointed expecta-
tions due to deterioration, internal breakdown 
or nonaccidental cause, on the other hand, lies 
in contract. 
Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 450. 
Davidson in this action is not claiming damages for 
economic loss, i.e., damages for loss of or repair of the beam. 
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Rather, Davidson is seeking damages for the property damage caused 
by the defective laminated beam which Davidson purchased from 
Sproul. Accordingly, even if Davidson!s claim for breach of 
warranty is barred, its negligence claim is viable and governed by 
the applicable limitation in Utah Code Ann. Title 78, Chapter 12 
(1953) . 
B. The Four Year Tort Limitation Does Not Bar Davidson's Claim for 
Negligence. 
In Perry, this court stated that: 
As a general rule, a cause of action for 
indemnity does not arise until the liability of 
the party seeking indemnity results in his 
damage, either through payment of a sum clearly 
owed or through the injured party's obtaining an 
enforceable judgment. As a corollary, the 
statute of limitations on an indemnity action 
does not begin to run until the cause of action 
accrues, even though the statute of limitations 
on the underlying action may have run. (Cita-
tions omitted) 
Perry, 681 P.2d at 218. Although the general rule did not apply in 
Perry because the U.C.C. limitation barred Perry's claim for 
economic loss, the general rule does apply to negligence actions 
where the claim is for property damage caused by a product's 
failure. 
Under the general rule, Davidson's claim for indemnity did 
not arise until November 16, 1983. Accordingly this action which 
was filed July 26, 198 3—approximately four months earlier than the 
settlement date—could not conceivably be barred by the applicable 
limitation statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sproul is proceeding under a false premise on this appeal. 
Although application of Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-725 (1980) in Perry 
was proper since the plaintiff there was seeking damages only for 
economic loss, the statute should be limited solely to its com-
mercial context. If applied in situations where the gravamen of the 
claim is tort, the statute is unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, even if this Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. §70A-2-
725 (1980) bars Davidsonfs breach of warranty claim, the negligence 
claim against Sproul survives in any event. Davidson respectfully 
submits that the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
denying Sproulfs Motion for Summary Judgment and remand this case to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this .3/)^ day of June, 1987. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By Ity (L.L , 
L. Rich Humprferys 
M. Douglas Bayly 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. 
h 
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1987, to the following: 
Roy G. Haslam 
Paul D. Veasy 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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A D D E N D A 
Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
App, A 
70A-2-715. Buyer's incidental and consequential damages. 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation 
and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially 
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with 
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the 
delay or other breach. 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements 
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had 
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented 
by cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any 
breach of warranty. 
App . B 
70A-2-725. Statute of limitations in contracts for sale. 
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced 
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the orig-
inal agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to 
not less than one year but may not extend it. 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the 
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of war-
ranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where 
a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods 
and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perfor-
mance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should 
have been discovered. 
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection 
(1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another 
action for the same breach such other action may be commenced 
after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after 
the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted 
from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or 
neglect to prosecute. 
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of 
limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued 
before this act becomes effective. 
App . C 
78-15-3. Statute of limitations — Application. 
(1) No action shall be brought for the recovery of damages for personal 
injury, death or damage to property more than six years after the date of 
initial purchase for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manu-
facture, of a product, where that action is based upon, or arises out of, any of 
the following* 
(a) breach of any implied warranties; 
(b) defects in design, inspection, testing or manufacture; 
(c) failure to warn; 
(d) failure to properly instruct in the use of a product: or 
(e) any other alleged defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in 
relation to a product. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability, but shall not apply to any cause of action 
where the personal injury, death or damage to property occurs withm two 
years after the effective date of this act. 
A p p . D 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders, 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the Supreme Court within 20 
days after the entry of such order of the district court, with proof of service on 
all other parties to the action. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. Petitioner shall deposit with the clerk of 
the Supreme Court 7 copies of the petition, together with the filing fee for 
filing a notice of appeal in the district court and the docketing fee in the 
Supreme Court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk shall 
forthwith give notice of such order by mail to the respective parties and shall 
transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy of the petition and 
filing fee to the district court where such petition and order shall be filed in 
lieu of a notice of appeal. If the petition is denied, the filing fee shall be 
refunded. 
(c) Content of petition; answer. The petition shall contain: 
(1) a statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the con-
trolling question of law determined by the order of the district court; 
(2) a statement of the question of law and a demonstration that the 
question was properly raised before the district court and ruled upon; 
(3) a statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory appeal 
should be permitted: and' 
(4) a statement of the reason why the appeal may materially advance 
the termination of the litigation. 
The petition shall include or have annexed thereto a copy of the order of the 
district court from which an appeal is sought and of any findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and opinion relating thereto. Within 10 days after service 
)f the petition, any other party may file an answer in opposition or concur-
rence. The petition and answerls) shall be submitted without oral argument 
mless otherwise ordered. 
(d) Grant of permission. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be 
granted only if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision, or that a determination of the correctness 
of such order before final judgment will better serve the administration and 
interests of justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth the particu-
lar issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such terms, 
including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as the court may deter-
mine. If the petition is granted, the appeal shall be deemed to have been 
docketed in the Supreme Court by the granting of the petition, and all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and within the 
time required, for appeals from final judgments. 
App. E 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
App. F 
